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1.

Introduction
In most dynamic traffic congestion models, congestion tolls must vary continuously over time to achieve the full social optimum. This is also true of Vickrey's (1969) 'bottleneck model' of the morning rush hour in which congestion takes the form of queuing at a bottleneck and drivers choose their departure times to minimize their travel cost. Yet no existing road pricing scheme has such sophisticated, continuously time-varying tolls. The closest approximations of this ideal have so-called 'step tolls' in which the toll takes on different values over discrete time intervals, but is constant within each interval. 1 Given the prevalence of step-tolling schemes, they have received surprisingly little attention in the scholarly literature.
Two step-tolling schemes for the bottleneck model have been studied: one by Lindsey (1990, 1993) and the other by Laih (1994 Laih ( , 2004 . For brevity, we will refer to their models and treatments as the "ADL model" and the "Laih model" respectively.
These models each have their limitations or drawbacks. There are three problems with the ADL model. First, it is limited to a single-step toll that is either "on" or "off". Second, equilibrium in the model exists only if a mass of drivers departs when the toll comes off, with individual positions in the mass determined randomly. Mass departures are problematic in practice, and empirical evidence for them is scant.
Third, and most fundamentally, the ADL model ignores the fact that as the end of the tolling period approaches, drivers have an incentive to stop before reaching the tolling point and wait until the toll ends. Waiting has indeed been observed on some tolled facilities.
Singapore implemented step tolls in 1998 when it introduced Electronic Road Pricing, and for the first few years tolls were changed in half-hour intervals. Some of the toll schedules involved large changes, and motorists were observed slowing down before they reached a toll 1 Many road-pricing schemes feature step tolls. The London congestion pricing scheme has a fixed toll from 7 am to 6 pm on weekdays (see the scheme's website at www.tfl.gov.uk/tfl/roadusers/congestioncharge/whereandwhen/; accessed October 20, 2010). Singapore's Electronic Road Pricing system features multi-step toll schedules on expressways and arterials. For instance, at the Bugis-Marina Centre (Nicoll Highway), the toll has 7 steps during the weekday morning peak (rates for 3 May to 1 August 2010, at www.onemotoring.com.sg/publish/onemotoring/en/on_the_roads/ERP_Rates.html, accessed on 11 May 2010). The toll scheme in Stockholm has 10 steps between 6:30 am and 6:29 pm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_congestion_tax, accessed 11 May 2010). And the westbound express-lane on State Route 91 in California has eight steps in the toll during the morning peak on Monday to Thursday with the toll ranging from $1.30 to $4.55 (toll schedule effective October 1, 2010, www.octa.net/91_schedules.aspx, accessed on 25 October 2010).
gantry to take advantage of a toll decrease. 2 In 2003, five-minute graduated rates were introduced between some half-hour periods to deter this behaviour. 3 More recently, slowing down occurred at the Golden Gate Bridge when step tolling was introduced in July 2010. A newspaper article reports how drivers slowed up considerably in the minutes before the toll was lowered from $6 to $4. One driver is quoted as saying: "You bet I waited, I'm saving a couple of bucks" (Mercury News, 2010) . Finally, Fosgerau (2011) reports that such braking behaviour also occurs with the step toll scheme in Stockholm.
In both his papers, Laih (1994 Laih ( , 2004 considers multi-step tolling. He also avoids some of the problems of the ADL model, by not modelling mass departures. Laih (2004) indicates that he assumes that drivers who choose to pass the bottleneck after a certain tolling period can wait on a set of secondary lanes without impeding other drivers who do pass the bottleneck in that tolling period. Nevertheless, as in the ADL model, Laih overlooks the incentive for drivers who use the main lanes to delay passage through the bottleneck when the toll is about to drop. Laih's model is also limited in scope because many roads do not have separate lanes, or even shoulders, where motorists can pull out of the traffic stream. As explained later, without such separate queues, the ADL model would be appropriate, and Laih's analysis would be inconsistent with his parameter-value assumptions.
In this paper we make two contributions. First and foremost, we analyze step-tolling in the bottleneck model under the assumption that drivers do stop and wait for a toll to decrease if the cost of waiting is less than the amount of toll saved. Unlike in the ADL and Laih models, the equilibrium is behaviourally consistent. Unlike in the ADL model, the equilibrium is free of mass departures. And unlike in Laih's formulation, the equilibrium does not require the presence of two sets of traffic lanes. One could object that stopping is dangerous and poses the risk of a traffic citation or fine. However, stopping does occur as noted above. Moreover, in lieu of stopping drivers can slow down in the kilometres leading up to a toll point and time their arrival just before the toll drops. The analytics of the model are the same whether drivers slow down or stop. To allow for both possibilities we will refer to the new model as the "braking model". A notable feature of equilibrium in the braking model is that the bottleneck is unused while drivers are stopped. This loss of effective capacity undercuts the efficiency gains from tolling in comparison with the ADL and Laih models.
Our second contribution is to extend the ADL model to multiple toll steps. Doing so generalizes the ADL model as well as making it more empirically relevant since a number of tolling schemes have toll schedules with multiple steps. In the equilibrium of the ADL model with multiple toll steps, a mass of drivers departs after each toll reduction. This equilibrium is arguably less problematic than the equilibrium with one step because the numbers of drivers in each mass departure is smaller, and the incentives for drivers to stop before each toll reduction are weaker. After developing the braking model, and extending the ADL model to multiple steps, we compare the equilibria in the ADL, Laih and braking models as a function of model parameters and the number of toll steps. We also assess the efficiency loss from step tolling in the braking model due to gaps in usage of the bottleneck.
While our analysis of step tolling builds significantly on the literature it has some limitations. One limitation is that it ignores the drivers' incentives to speed up in order to pass through the tolling point just before a toll increase. Incorporating speeding into the bottleneck model is not straightforward, and it would probably be better to use a flow congestion model. 4 Another limitation is that we consider only toll schedules with the same numbers of steps "up" and steps "down". We also allow the toll levels to vary freely rather than requiring the level of each step-up toll to match the level of the corresponding step-down toll.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins by presenting the basic bottleneck model, and solving for the no-toll equilibrium and social optimum. It then presents a graphical treatment of the one-step toll in the ADL, Laih and braking models. Section 3 extends the analysis to multi-step tolls and provides a formal derivation of optimal toll schedules for each 4 Braking behaviour could also be studied using other models. Chu (1999) analyzes one-step tolling using a dynamic model with flow congestion although he does not consider braking. His one-step toll generally attains a larger fraction of the firstbest efficiency gains than the one-step toll in the bottleneck model. The fraction depends on the specification of the travel time function and the number of users, whereas in the bottleneck model the fraction is constant as we will show. 5 Optimal toll schedules in the Laih model and the braking model turn out to be symmetric anyway. model. Section 4 provides a brief numerical comparison of the models and assesses the efficiency loss due to braking in the braking model. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main results and ideas for future research.
2.
No-toll equilibrium, first-best optimum, and single-step tolls
No-toll equilibrium and first-best optimum
Both the no-toll equilibrium and the first-best or social optimum of the bottleneck model are described in detail in Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1990 , 1993 , 1998 , as well as in various textbooks such as Small and Verhoef (2007) . We will therefore be brief, while keeping the exposition self-contained.
In the bottleneck model a continuum of N identical individuals travel alone by car from a common origin to a common destination connected by a single road that is subject to bottleneck queuing congestion. Equations (4) and (5) together yield
The equilibrium generalized cost and price in the no-toll (NT) equilibrium are therefore (7) with
The total private cost (PC) and total social cost (TC) for the N travellers are equal:
Because the schedule delay cost is linear in arrival time, half of these costs are travel delay costs, and half are schedule delay costs.
Queuing delay is a pure deadweight loss in the bottleneck model: shortening the queue reduces travel time delays without raising schedule delays as long as flow through the bottleneck remains equal to s. First-best time-varying tolling, also called 'fine tolling', therefore eliminates queuing. To achieve this, the toll schedule is chosen to match the cost of travel delay,
, in the no-toll equilibrium. The travel period is still given by eqn. (6a,b).
The private cost of a trip remains unchanged, but the social cost of a trip is reduced by half: 
In the next three subsections we discuss how single-step (coarse) tolling works in the ADL,
Laih and braking models. We defer formal derivations of the equilibria until Section 3 where we provide derivations for multi-step tolls. Lindsey (1990, 1993) were the first to consider step tolling in the bottleneck model. They focused on a single-step toll, or coarse toll in their terminology. The coarse toll is defined by its level,  , and the times at which it is turned on ( t The qualitative properties of the optimal coarse toll depend on the relative magnitudes of  and . If    , the coarse toll does not affect the timing of arrivals and the solution is straightforward. But if    , as Small (1982) and most later empirical studies have found, the arrival period is affected and the analytics are more complicated.
Coarse tolling: the ADL model
To see why this is the case, it is helpful to describe in detail the equilibrium with the coarse toll when    . Figure 1 The question now arises how drivers who pass the bottleneck after t  , and pay no toll, can be equally well off as earlier drivers. Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1990) 
which simplifies to
Equation (11) is consistent with the assumption
If    , as empirical studies suggest, no one will depart after t  , neither when the queue dissipates nor later.
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The equilibrium depicted in Figure 1 then applies. Because the bottleneck operates at full capacity throughout the peak 8 , the peak has the same duration as the no-toll equilibrium and social optimum. But the timing of the peak,   
The solution works out to
Given    , the peak begins later than with no toll. Since the first driver incurs only a schedule delay cost, and the expected price of a trip is the same for everyone, the expected price falls. The drop in price comes despite the fact that the shift in the peak causes total schedule delay costs to rise. experiences a deterministic trip price, and the last driver in the cohort experiences no queuing delay. Therefore, in equilibrium, the schedule delay costs for the first and last drivers are equal, condition (5) applies, and the timing of the peak is given by eqns. (6a,b).
Figure 2. Equilibrium with a coarse toll: the ADL model for >
The optimal coarse toll will be derived in Section 3 as a special case of the optimal multistep toll of the ADL model. We now turn to consider the single-step toll in the Laih model.
Coarse tolling: the Laih model
Laih (1994, 2004) considers multi-step tolls, under the assumption that tolling does not affect the timing of arrivals. In both papers Laih assumes that 0
However, the 10 Daniel (2009) discusses equilibrium with multi-step tolls with    in the context of airport congestion.
11 Laih (1994) states this assumption as inequality (5) 
Coarse tolling: the braking model
Both the ADL model and the Laih model overlook that drivers have an incentive to delay reaching the tolling point when the toll is about to drop if the waiting cost they incur is outweighed by the money they will save. The braking model takes this incentive into account.
The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 4 . when the last driver pays the toll. The bottleneck is then idle for a period
a queue is building up, but no-one passes the tolling point. Consequently, the arrival period  
, s e t t   is longer than in the no-toll equilibrium and social optimum. Since all travel times are deterministic, the schedule delay costs of the first and last drivers are equal. Departures start earlier, and end later, than in the no-toll equilibrium and social optimum (i.e. s s t t   and e e t t   ), and the equilibrium price is therefore higher. This contrasts with both the ADL model in which the coarse toll causes private costs to fall, and the Laih model in which private costs are unchanged by the toll. The cost rises in the braking model because the bottleneck goes unused for a certain time interval before the toll ends.
The braking model avoids the difficulties in the ADL and Laih models. First, it is behaviourally consistent since it accounts for the possibility that drivers can reduce their travel costs by braking. Second, it avoids the problematic nature of mass departures in the ADL model. And third, it avoids the requirement of the Laih model for parallel traffic lanes.
Multi-step tolls
Overview
The coarse tolls described in Section 2 are a simple case of multi-step tolls. The same behavioural assumptions and solution concepts apply for tolls with multiple steps in each of the ADL, Laih and braking models. But the analytics become more complicated, and formulas for the optimal timing and levels of the step tolls in the ADL model are complex and rather opaque.
Before the analytics of the three models are presented, some additional terminology and notation need to be introduced. The toll schedules are assumed to have m levels with a series of increasing 'step-up' tolls while drivers arrive early, and a series of decreasing 'step-down' tolls while drivers arrive late. Tolling periods are indexed so that period 1 is the central period 
Step-tolling in the Laih model
Optimal toll levels and tolling periods for the Laih model are described in Laih (1994 Laih ( , 2004 .  is an increasing function of m so that total idle time actually increases as the toll structure becomes more refined. Hence, with braking the step toll does not asymptotically approach the first-best optimum in the limit m   .
The timing and levels of the optimal step toll in the braking model are derived in Appendix C. The toll levels work out to 
The toll levels are the same as in eqn. (14) 
The relative efficiency of the braking toll is derived using eqn. (21) and eqn. (10):
The relative efficiency of the braking toll can be compared with the efficiency in the Laih and ADL models. The comparison is straightforward for the Laih model. From eqn. (22) 
For the coarse toll in the ADL model (see Appendix B)
The relative efficiency of tolling in the two models is therefore . Relative to tolling in the ADL model, the efficiency loss from tolling due to braking cannot exceed about 30%.
Numerical results
To get a better idea of how much the three tolling models differ quantitatively, and how braking affects the efficiency of tolling, we turn to a brief numerical analysis. We use the same values for the unit cost parameters as Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1990) : =6.4, 14 The opposite case, <, would imply that early arriving drivers would prefer to extend their trip.
=3.9, and =15.21.
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We set N=9000 and s= 3600 vehicles per hour so that travel lasts for 2½ hours in all regimes except the braking model. Optimal toll schedules were computed (in Mathematica) using the analytical results presented in the appendices, and various numerical consistency checks were performed to make sure that we indeed consider second-best equilibria. Figure 6 shows the three step-tolling schemes for m=5 along with the first-best toll for comparison. Consistent with the analytical results in Section 3, toll levels are the same in the braking model and the Laih model, but the timing differs. The early-arrival tolling periods have the same duration, but the late-arrival periods are slightly longer in the braking model.
Tolls and equilibrium prices
Braking prolongs travel by 18 minutes, which is nearly 12% of the peak duration without braking.
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In the ADL model the early-arrival tolls differ only slightly from the other two models. The timing of the steps also differs only slightly from the Laih model because of the small departure delay. For late arrivals, the difference in toll levels between the ADL model and the Laih model is larger due to the asymmetry in the ADL toll schedule. The braking toll exceeds the other two tolls as well as the fine toll over most of the travel period (but recall that the braking toll is not paid during intervals when the bottleneck is idle). 15 The results of interest depend only on the ratios /   and /   . need not be welfare enhancing to try and avoid this by opening a parallel queuing facility, e.g. a shoulder, to allow for a Laih equilibrium to replace the ADL equilibrium.
The braking toll produces appreciably smaller cost reductions. As the number of steps approaches infinity, the total cost reduction approaches an upper limit of only 43%. As per eqn. (23), the efficiency gain from the braking toll is 14% lower than the gain from the Laih toll regardless of the number of steps. For the ADL toll the difference is slightly larger: 21% with one step, 16% with 5 steps and asymptotically approaches 14% as m   . 
Sensitivity analysis for relative efficiency gains
The numerical results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are derived for a single set of parameter values and it is useful to test the robustness of these results by conducting some sensitivity analysis.
Arguably of greatest interest is the efficiency of the braking toll compared to the toll in the other two models, and attention is limited to this here. The relative efficiency of the braking toll and the Laih toll, BL r , given in eqn. (23) depends only on the ratios /   and /   .    ; see the front corner of Figure 9 . Over an appreciable portion of the surface, the braking toll underperforms the Laih toll by 10-15%. 
Conclusions
This paper has reconsidered step tolling in the bottleneck model. Its main contribution is to remedy an inconsistency in earlier studies by Lindsey (1990, 1993) and Laih (1994 Laih ( , 2004 . These studies ignored that when a toll is about to drop, drivers have an incentive to slow down or stop before reaching the tolling point and wait. We develop a The fact that braking occurs in practice, and can be quite costly, raises the question how it can be prevented. Stopping in the middle of traffic lanes or parking on the shoulder can be deterred by enforcing traffic laws. Slowing down is more difficult to prevent although it can be discouraged by imposing minimum speed limits. In either case, enforcement is costly. The problems associated with braking arise when tolls are levied at specific locations. They could be avoided by replacing location-based toll collection schemes with more sophisticated systems with charges proportional to distance driven.
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The analysis in the paper could be extended in various directions. One is to model drivers' incentives to speed in order to reach a tolling point before a toll increase. Although speeding is the mirror image of braking, the bottleneck model is not well-designed to handle speeding because it does not feature a smooth trade-off between travel speed and accident risks.
A second possible extension is to account for the inconvenience or risk incurred by drivers in slowing down or stopping. To the extent that these costs are fixed, drivers may choose not to slow down or stop if the toll payment avoided is small. Multi-step tolling schemes with several, small toll adjustments may therefore be less vulnerable to braking than coarse schemes with tolls that are on or off.
In the standard bottleneck model travellers are assumed to care about when they arrive at their destination, but not when they leave the origin. This may be a reasonable approximation for the morning commute, but not for the evening commute or some other types of trips where early departure may be heavily penalized. The bottleneck model with departure-time preferences has been studied by a few authors including Vickrey (1973), Fargier (1983 ), and de Palma and Lindsey (2002a , 2002b . However, to our knowledge step tolling has not been considered in the variant of the bottleneck model with departure-time preferences. 
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The price, p, does not change due to step tolling, and total private cost is given by eqn. .6) , and taking derivatives gives the following first-order conditions: 
B.1. Overview of solution
The solution presented here is based on heuristic reasoning rather than a rigorous derivation of the general structure of the toll. The timing of the step toll is derived on the following assumptions:
 During the early arrival period there is an interval prior to each step up in the toll when no user departs. The queue drops to zero at the instant when the toll steps up.
 During the late arrival period a mass of drivers departs each time the toll steps down. With    , the queue drops to zero at the instant when the toll takes its next step down and the next mass of drivers departs. All drivers who arrive late depart in masses; unlike with    there are no time intervals during which drivers depart at a finite rate.
B.2. Derivation of solution
The first step is to derive the timing of the toll schedule for given toll levels. For early arrivals the solution is the same for    and   (B.8)
Equilibrium price as a function of tolls
The expected price for users in the last mass to depart is: 
Total social costs
Total social costs are
Using eqns. (B.6), (B.17) and (B.18), TC can be written as:
First-order conditions for tolls
The first-order conditions for optimal tolls are derived by differentiating eqn. (B.19). The first-order condition for 1  is: 
